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MILTON v. ESCUE

LEGITIMACY OF CHILDREN OF VOID
OR VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
Milton v. Escue'

Plaintiff-appellant, natural daughter of decedent, filed
this declaratory proceeding against defendants-appellees, 2
the brother and three sisters of the decedent, and the
Maryland ancillary administrator of his local real estate,
for a .declaration that she is the legitimate daughter of the
decedent, and entitled to inherit his Maryland real estate
to the exclusion of the defendants-appellees. Plaintiff
alleged that she was born out of wedlock to the decedent,
who had never married her mother, other than by a subsequent non-ceremonial ("common law") marriage in Virginia, which by Virginia law was ineffectual to make her
father and mother husband and wife, but which she contended was sufficient to legitimate the plaintiff as the daughter of her father. The trial court sustained a demurrer to,
and dismissed, the petition, but, on appeal, the Court of
Appeals remanded, with permission to the plaintiff to
amend to make a more specific allegation about the marriage between her parents, in which case and upon sufficient
proof thereof, she would be entitled to claim as the legitimate daughter, under the normal rule that legitimacy or
legitimation by the law of the domicile of the father will be
recognized in Maryland.
While the case specifically is concerned with Maryland's
recognition of legitimacy or legitimation, by the applicable
law of the domicile, even though such result would not
have been reached had Maryland law been applicable, yet
it is proposed principally to discuss the implications of the
case, and of the different Virginia law, with reference to
the present Maryland law of the subject and the possibility
of improving that local law, perhaps along the lines of the
Virginia legislation. On the particular conflict of laws point,
the Court merely followed and clarified its previous ruling
in the important case of Holloway v. Safe Deposit & Trust

Co.,' where, at least for the devolution of personal property,
it had recognized legitimation under the laxer rules of an193

A. 2d 258 (Md., 1952).
As was pointed out in the opinion, ibid, 265, the mother of the appellant
was not a necessary party, inasmuch as the case involved merely plaintiff's
legitimacy, as against her father, and not whether the father and mother
were husband and wife.
'151 Md. 321, 134 A. 497 (1926), ap. dismissed, 274 U. S. 724-5 (1927).
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other state which were applicable because that was the
domicile of the father (and of the child) 4 at the time.
In the Holloway case, legitimation by the applicable law
of Nevada, which did not even require the pretense of a
marriage between the parents, but merely recognition by
the father, was held sufficient to entitle the child to claim
as the legitimate child of the father for purposes of Maryland litigation. This, of course, went much farther than the
Maryland law, which requires a valid marriage to the
mother, as well as recognition by the father, in order to
achieve legitimation. In the Milton case, the Court made it
clear that it was prepared to extend the idea of recognition
of foreign legitimation to the devolution of Maryland real
estate, as well as to personal property, and it specifically
rejected any distinction between the two problems, and
accepted the modern view that foreign legitimation should
as well be recognized for real property as for personal
property.
Turning now to the principal scope of discussion, it
should be noted, as pointed out above, that Maryland law
requires a valid marriage to the mother, as well as recognition, in order to achieve retroactive legitimation of a child
born out of wedlock. Prior to 1949, it regarded the issue of
a void marriage, or a voidable one which was annulled, as
illegitimate. But Virginia law, as applied here is much
more liberal in both respects, for that Virginia law will
recognize, either for purposes of initial legitimacy of a
child born after a questionable marriage, or for subsequent
legitimation by such a marriage after the birth of the child,
not only a valid marriage sufficient to create the relationship of husband and wife, but an invalid marriage of the
void or voidable type. This includes a so-called "common
law" marriage, by simple contract without any ceremony
at all, which is insufficient to create the relationship of
husband and wife, but is sufficient to achieve legitimacy or
legitimation.
By a statute enacted in 1949, 5 and very slightly clarified
in 1950,1 Maryland adopted a partial version of the Virginia
' It will be noted that the Maryland Court, in both the Holloway, ibid, and
Milton, supra, n. 1, cases, stressed the domicile of the father and the child.
General law is concerned only with that of the father; Restatement of Conflicts, Secs. 137-140; STUMBE=, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS (2nd ed., 1951), 330 et seq.
5Md. Code (1951), Art. 16, Sec. 36; Md. Laws 1949, Ch. 29.
" Md. Laws 1950, Ch. 33, which struck out the following second sentence:
"In such event, if it shall appear that such marriage was contracted
in good faith by one of the parties thereto, and in Ignorance of any
obstacle to its validity, that fact shall be found and declared in the

decree."
leaving the statute as now quoted, infra, n. 8.
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idea, in an attempt to preserve the legitimacy of the children of defective marriages which are annulled, although
it left uncertain whether a similar result will follow for
the issue of marriages totally void and not annulled by
any proceeding. The issue of merely voidable marriages
not annulled by any proceeding, would, no doubt, be regarded as legitimate under common law principles.' Furthermore, it is not clear under the current Maryland legislation whether the child must be born subsequent to the
marriage, or whether such defective marriages as are within
the scope of the statute will also count for purposes of
retroactive legitimation under our present rules concerning that.
The statute in question now reads as follows:8
"This section shall apply whenever any criminal or
equity Court of this state has for any reason annulled
a marriage, and declared it to be null and void, or
whenever any equity Court of this state has decreed a
divorce a vinculo matrimonii for any cause which by
the laws of this state render a marriage null and void
ab initio. In such case the issue of such a marriage
shall be deemed and declared to be the legitimate issue
of the parents thereof."
It is the belief of the writer of this note that this legislation, while attempting to serve a desirable policy, does not
go far enough, and does not fully carry out the indicated
intention. It is plausible to argue that, under it, the resulting legitimacy, where that would not result at common law,
only happens when the defective marriage is actually annulled by a proceeding. Thus the issue of totally void marriages which are not annulled by a proceeding (as they do
not have to be because total voidness may be asserted collaterally), would be worse off, because there was no annullment, than if there were an annullment.
But this is just the opposite of the situation at common
law for the issue of merely voidable marriages, because they
are regarded as legitimate unless there has been a proceeding, in which case the effect of the annulment is to render
the issue illegitimate ab initio.9
Cf. Strahorn, Void and Voidable Marriages in Maryland and Their
Annulment, 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 213 (1938).
, Supra, ns. 5 and 6, discussed also in Strahorn, Fifteen Years of Change
in Maryland Marriage and Annulment Law and Domestic Relations Procedures, 13 Md. L. Rev. 128, 129 (1953).
1Supra,n. 7.
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If this interpretation be correct then it would seem that
some amendment of the Maryland statute would be indicated in order to carry out more clearly the legislative
policy of preserving the legitimacy of the children of invalid
marriages. That result should obtain whether the marriage
be void or merely voidable, and, in either event, whether
there be an annulment proceeding or not.
For it would seem to make no difference, if it is to be the
State policy to preserve the legitimacy of the children of
invalid marriages, whether the defect be one making the
marriage totally void or merely voidable, or whether there
is a proceeding, if one is either permissible or necessary.
Therefore, it is suggested that an amended statute,
going as far as the Virginia one, ° is desirable, and some such
language as follows would seem to effectuate that policy:
"The issue of marriages, including marriages which
are invalid for lack of proper solemnization, which are
voidable, or null and void in law, or annulled by an
equity or criminal court, or by a divorce for the reason
that the marriage is void ab initio, shall nevertheless
be the legitimate issue of both parents, and any such
marriage aforesaid shall be sufficient to legitimate prior
born issue under the provisions of Article 46, Section 6,
of this Code. Whenever the legitimacy or legitimation
of issue shall be governed by the laws of this State, the
above provisions shall apply regardless whether the
marriage was contracted within or without this State
or annulled or terminated by proceedings in a court of
this State or elsewhere."
It will be noted that the last sentence above tries to make
it perfectly clear that legitimacy shall be recognized in the
cases provided whenever the quality of legitimacy is governed by the law of Maryland, regardless whether the marriage was performed or contracted in Maryland or the proceeding, if any, was in Maryland or elsewhere. It would
seem sensible to make this perfectly clear, to guard against
10

Code of Virginia (1950)
Section 64-6:
"When marriage legitimateschildren. - If a man, having had a child
or children by a woman, shall afterwards intermarry with her, such
child or children, or their descendants, if recognized by him before or
after marriage, shall be deemed legitimate (Code 1919, Sec. 5269)."
Section 64-7:
"Issue legitimate though marriage null. - The issue of marriages
deemed null in law, or dissolved by a court, shall nevertheless be legitimate (Code 1919, Section 5270)."
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any too-narrow interpretation that would require either
the contract of marriage, or the particular annulment proceeding, if any, to occur in Maryland, so long as the law of
Maryland, as the law of the domicile at the appropriate
time, shall be the governing law as to initial legitimacy or
subsequent legitimation.
It will be noted also that the proposal makes specific
what is the case law of Virginia, under its legislation, as
decided in the principal case, that the idea of a marriage
invalid in law goes even to marriages invalid solely for
lack of ceremony, i.e., "common law" marriages. Virginia,"
like Maryland, 2 rejects common law marriage as a way of
becoming husband and wife inter sese, although Maryland
is a little bit stricter about the ceremony, in that it requires
a religious ceremony, and has no provision for a civil ceremony. Maryland is like Virginia in the rejection of the
idea of common law marriage, except that Virginia now
accepts such a marriage for purposes of legitimacy of the
child of the father, even though it will not do so for the
relationship of husband and wife.
There would seem to be no reason why Maryland should
not do likewise, if it is going to extend and clarify the policy
already announced in the 1949 and 1950 legislation 4 now
under discussion, and it would seem desirable to make this
explicit in any amended statute, rather than to run the
gauntlet of judicial interpretation.
Other jurisdictions have gone much farther in the way
of ameliorating illegitimacy, some like Nevada, 15 as was
recognized in the Holloway case, by requiring mere recognition without even a pretended marriage to the mother.
It is not here suggested that Maryland should go that far,
but rather that it should go only as far as Virginia has gone
in making it clear that the offspring of any defective marriage, even those lacking ceremony, shall be legitimate,
whether the defect makes it void or voidable, and whether
there be a proceeding or not, or one is required or not.
Doing as is suggested in the proposed statute would
merely make more explicit the general policy indicated by
the present Maryland attempt to handle the problem of
legitimacy of the issue of invalid marriages. It is to be
u Offield

v. Davis, 100 Va. 250, 40 S. E. 910 (1902).
Denison v. Denison, 35 Md. 361 (1872).
Virginia regards the license as mandatory, Offield v. Davis, supra, n. 11,
where Maryland regards the religious ceremony as mandatory, Denison v.
Denison, ibid, n. 12.
"Supra, ns. 5, 6, 8.
15Nevada Oompiled Laws (1929), Sec. 9483.
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hoped that we shall profit by following the example we
have from Virginia in the principal case.
It would seem better to draft practically a brand new
statute rather than merely to add clauses to the statute as
it now reads, because this would require awkward and extra
terminology to achieve the same end. So it is proposed
that some such language as above would be more desirable
to carry out a policy of clarifying the legislation already
enacted.
It is interesting to note, in sampling the similar legislation of other states16 than Virginia and Maryland, how those
states which have in some way tried to deal with preserving
the legitimacy of the issue of defective marriages have
done so. Very frequently one finds statutes doing so only
for marriages defective in a certain named way, with no
provision for marriages invalid for other reasons. This
would seem to indicate that the draftsman was thinking of
a very narrow problem, and not of the whole matter of
legitimacy of the children of all types of invalid marriages.
The question whether the little understood provision
for absolute divorce for any ground making the marriage
void ab initio was a way of trying to save the legitimacy
of the issue of such marriages is now moot, 7 since the 1949
and 1950 legislation in Maryland. It is now made explicit
that such issue shall be legitimate after a divorce for that
reason, and thus we shall probably never have a judicial
ruling"8 whether the divorce statute itself, without the subsequential legislation now under discussion, did or did not
achieve the effect of preserving legitimacy.
It would be interesting to speculate as to other aspects
of marriage and annulment law, if such a clarified statute
as proposed above is to be passed. There are those who
believe that many rulings on the merits of annulment
cases, or cases of collateral attack on marriage, have been
influenced by a judicial desire to preserve the legitimacy
of the offspring of the marriage who would otherwise be
found illegitimate, if the ruling were in favor of the annulment or of total voidness.

1

1

VERNiER, AMEaICAN FAMiLY LAWS, Vol. 1 (1931), Sec. 48, Vol. 4 (1936),
Sec. 247, and Supp. (1938) ; 56 Harv. L. Rev. 624 (1943) ; 84 A. L. R. 499.
11Cf. Strahorn, 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 213, supra, n. 7, and 13 Md. L, Rev. 128,
129, 8upra, n. &
18There is still a slight possibility of such a ruling in the event that Md.
Code (1951), Art. 16, Sec. 36, is determined not to be retroactive. Such a
situation would arise if either the marriage were performed or the divorce
granted prior to the effective date of the statute, whereupon, in the event
of the necessity for such a ruling, the prior law of legitimacy would still
have to be applied.
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If a clear cut statute is passed that will preserve the
legitimacy of such issue if an annulment is granted, or if a
marriage be declared totally void on collateral attack, then
that need for adjusting the marriage law to the realities of
the legitimacy situation will be obviated. It may be that
some different substantive annulment and marriage validity
law will result in a framework where there is not the same
disastrous consequence of ruling against the validity of
a marriage.
Be that as it may, now that we have set up a State policy
of preserving the legitimacy of the children of invalid marriages, at least where there is some stated form of annulment proceeding, it would seem consistent and desirable
to go the whole way and to straighten out all other possible
difficulties mentioned above, including (1) whether the law
applies to totally void marriages which are not annulled,
(2) whether legitimation as well as initial legitimacy may
be accomplished by a defective marriage, (3) whether the
idea extends, as it does in Virginia, to marriages defective
for lack of ceremony, and, finally, (4) the conflict of laws
difficulty.

